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RECENT CASES
CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE -

STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS -

EFFECT OF NON-

Plaintiff and defendant,
both nonresidents, were involved in an automobile collision in South Dakota.
Jurisdiction over the defendant was obtained pursuant to the Nonresident
Motorist Service Statute'. Although more than two years had elapsed since
the collision, plaintiff contended that the statute of limitations was tolled
because of the defendant's absence from the state and the plaintiff's consequent
inability to obtain personal service. The Supreme Court in reversing the
decision of the trial court, which had accepted plaintiff's contention, held,
that where provision is made for substituted service in actions arising out of
motor vehicle accidents the defendant is as subject to process as if he resided
in the state and the statute providing for the tolling of the statute of limitaticns is inapplicable. Busby v. Shafer, 66 N.W.2d 910 (S. D. 1954).
Prior to enactment of substituted service statutes the only method of obtaining personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant was by service
upon him while within the state2 . However, in order to protect a plaintiff whose
recovery was frustrated through no fault of his own, many states enacted
statutes providing for the suspension of the statute of limitations during a
nonresident defendant's absence from the state 3. These statutes have generally
been held inapplicable if the defendant, while himself temporarily absent, still
maintained a residence or place of business within the state and was thus
not considered a nonresident in terms of the statute 4, or if the defendant was
present within the state so that a plaintiff, with the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have served process upon him 5.
The fact that the statute of limitations did not run was small comfort to a
plaintiff if the defendant perpetually absented himself from the jurisdiction
of the courts of.the:.plaintiff's state. He was still without an effective means
of obtaining redress for his injuries. Recognizing that the increased use of
the automobile as a means of interstate transportation made this unfair
situation vastly more prevalent, many legislatures passed statutes providing
that the use of state highways.by a nonresident constitutes appointment of a
state official as the personal representative of such nonresident for the purpose
of service of process in any action which might accrue against him while
within its jurisdiction. "The obvious purpose of this . . . was to afford a
RESIDENT MOTORIST SERVICE ON TOLLING STATUTE -

1. S. D. Code §33-0809 (1939) "The use or operation by a nonresident or his agent

of a motor vehicle upon and over the highways of this state shall be deemed an appoint-

ment by such nonresident of the Secretary of State of South Dakota to be his true and
lawful attorney upon whom may be served legal process in any action or proceeding
against such nonresident growing out of such use of a motor vehicle over the highways
of this state resulting in damage or loss to persons or property, and said use or operation

shall be a signication of such nonresident's agreement that any such process in any action
against him which is so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served
upon him personally . . .".
2. See Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 Atl. 70 (1933).
3. E.g., Conn. Rev. Gen. Stat. §8330 (1949); Il. Rev. Stat. c. 83 §19 (1945);
Mich. Comp. Laws §609.17 (1948); N. D. Rev. Code §28-0132 (1943); S. D. Code
§33-0203 (Supp. 1939); Wis. Stat. §330.30 (1947).
4. Dorus v. Lyon, 92 Conn. 55, 101 Atl. 490 (1917); Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind.
174 (1879); Crowder v. Murphy, 61 Wash. 626, 112 Pac. 742 (1911).
5. Sims v. Tigrett, 229 Ala. 486, 158 So. 326 (1934); Foster v. Butler, 164 Cal.
623, 130 Pac. 6 (1913); Mack v. Mendels, 249 N. Y. 356, 164 N.E. 248 (1928).
6. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90 §3A (1932); Neb. Rev. Stat. c. 25 §530 (1943); N.
D. Rev. Code §28-0611 (1953); S. D. Code §33-0809 (1939); Wis. Stat. §85.05 (1947).

RECENT CASES
mcans by which the equivalent of personal service might be made upon -a
nonresident although he was not actually within the state". Courts considering
the application of tolling statutes in conjunction with nonresident motorist service statutes must, of course, decide whether an exception should be made to
the tolling statute so that substituted service becomes the only avenue of
relief available to the plaintiff, or whether the defendant's absence should
suspend the period of limitation so that plaintiff may at his own option proceed by substituted service or wait until personal service is possible8.
The majority of courts hold that since the substituted service statutes
provide the plaintiff with a complete remedy within the state the statute of
limitations will continue to run 9 . The minority view, set forth in the dissenting opinion in the instant case'", is that in the absence of an expressed
exception in the tolling statute dealing with' cases where the plaintiff could
have statutory service of process on the defendant, it is not within the province
of the court to create an exception". Courts upholding the majority opinion
reason "that it is the intent of that body (i. e. the legislature) that governs
and not the literal meaning of the words employed."12
It is submitted that the majority holding is the more justifiable. It is the
basic purpose of the tolling statute to prevent one from avoiding judgment
hy evading the service of process 13 . However, service remains impossible if
the defendant continues to remain unavailable. The use of statutory substituted
service removes this possibility and provides a method for a plaintiff to bring
such cases to bar within the statutory period.
DAVID A. VAALER

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW -

SIXTH AMENDMENT

-

RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION -

Plaintiff, warden of a state penitentiary, instituted mandamus proceedings to
compel defendant judges to vacate orders requiring plaintiff to produce ;a
convicted felon as a witness for the accused in a criminal prosecution. Plaintiff
refused on the strength of an Oregon statute authorizing examination of
imprisoned felons by deposition.' The court dismissed the writ of mandamus.
That part of the statute invoked by plaintiff was unconstitutional since it

7. Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 At. 70 (1933).
8. See 33 Ill. L. Rev. 351 (1938).
9.

Scorza v. Deatherage, 208 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1954); Tublitz v. Hirchfeld, 118

F.2d 29 (2nd Cir. 1941); Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, 166 Ati. 70 (1933);

Kokenge v. Holthaus, 243 Iowa 571, 52 N.W.2d (1952); Arrowood v. McMinn County,
173 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938); Reed v. Rosenfield, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d
189 (1947).
10. Judge Rudolph in his dissent said, "The majority opinion now writes into the
statute another exception. It is my view that such action usurps the legislative function.
'Where express exceptions are m.ade, the legal presumption is that the legislature did not
intend to save other cases from the operation of the statute.
In such cases the inference
is a strong one that no other exceptions were intended, and the rule generally applied -s
that an exception in a statute amounts to an affirmation of the application of its provisions
to all other cases not excepted"'".

11. Gotheiner v. Lenihan, 20 N. J. Misc. 119, 25 A.2d 430 (1942); Couts v. Rose,
152 Ohio St. 458, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950); Bode v. Flynn, 213 Wis. 509, 252 N.W.
284 (1934).
12; See Read v. Jerauld County, 70 S. D. 298, 17 N.W.2d 269 (1948); Brookings
County v. Murphy, 23 S. D. 311, 121 N.W. 793 (1909).
13. See Reed v. Rosenfield, 115 Vt. 76, 51 A.2d 189 (1947).
1. Ore. Rev. Stat. 44.230(3)

(1953).

